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Post Script
Tiziana Andina and Jacopo Domenicucci
STATES AND INTERGENERATIONAL BONDS
Institutions are naturally seen as the stable and relatively fixed backbone of the 
social world. While the structural role of institutions is usually discussed in social 
ontology, the temporal implications of this regulation are often overlooked. It is 
indeed tempting to take a present-centred approach to institutions. The latter 
clearly are instrumental in stabilizing and structuring the social coordination 
between a number of actors. But it is all too easy to focus only on their role in 
synchronic regulation, within a society frozen at a given time t. When diachronic 
considerations are brought into the picture, they generally deal with the past of a 
society, the roots of the social order and its conditions of emergence. In a sense, 
the modern political philosophy stemming from Hobbes didn’t help, bringing 
in conceptual devices such as the ‘social contract’ or the ‘state of nature’, whose 
temporal and historical features are ill-defined if not ruled out by definition 
(e.g. a-historicity, fiction). Nowadays, political philosophy is catching up with 
the debate around the idea of ‘intergenerational justice’, while social ontology 
is still subject to a presentist approach.
In her (2016: 105-178) presentation, Turin-based professor Tiziana Andina 
clearly departs from this a-temporal approach. She sets the scene for a tempo-
rally conscious social ontology and uses a distinctive diachronic approach in 
her understanding of the pillars of social reality. More precisely, Andina argues 
that institutions can’t be made sense of unless we take into account the way 
they shape the future and are oriented towards it. Specifically, Andina’s analysis 
is interested in what we may consider a meta-institution – an institution of 
institutions, fundamental for the very possibility of a number of other crucial 
institutions – namely the State. The State has its distinctive diachronic presence. 
It has a cross-generational lifespan and is able (and expected) to bring about 
‘intergenerational actions’, i.e. actions that either have effects over several genera-
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tions or that themselves need an effort that spans over different generations. The 
future-directedness of this meta-institution is brought to the fore by Andina’s 
ontology. This transgenerationality further carries specific normative demands 
that States have to face and that should be taken into consideration when ana-
lysing the appropriate mandates for a State, and a government within a State.
J.D.: You persuasively argue that to understand institutions we need to take 
into consideration their temporal features. You don’t just mean, I take it, that 
we need to consider their duration –the fact that they have a certain lifespan- 
but also that their very social function cannot be understood if we don’t focus 
on the specific cross-temporal effects they are meant to bring about. This seems 
especially relevant for the State and its intergenerational actions.
To what extent do you think that the cross-temporal dimension of the State 
plays a role in the development of trust at a social level? This boils down to 
asking how much you think that Hobbes’ take on the necessity of a central 
sanctioning authority is relevant and may be enriched, or spelled out more fully, 
in temporal terms: do States play a significant role in building trust precisely to 
the extent that they carry the promise of transgenerational stability? 
T.A.: To understand our social life we have to break down the enquiry at least into 
two strands: one in which we explore the pillars of social reality, and how they work; 
another in which we examine their modalities of perduration. As you correctly note, 
as human beings and as philosophers, we are usually much more interested in the 
first aspect. I guess this is due to a biological constraint: our interests lie in survival 
and in the preservation of life in the short-term, that is for a period including our 
life and that of our family and friends. Hume has observed this point very clearly. 
However, the ways our societies have been conceived and built require different forms 
of collaborations between people extending over a very long time. This fact needs, I 
think, further investigation. A starting point could be a reflection on what type of 
entity a State is and on what functions it has.
States, as well as other political entities like meta-States (e.g. the European Union), 
are here to last for a potentially infinite time. As such, they have, in my view, the 
obligation to take care of what I term ‘transgenerationality’, that is, a diachronic 
bond merging different generations that belong to the same political entity. I think 
that respect of this transgenerational bond is necessary to increase the trust in insti-
tutions and between people. I also believe that one of the main ways for States and 
meta-States to create and improve trust is precisely to recognize and take care of their 
transgenerationality. The bond between generations is crucial for any institution that 
wants to – and has to – perdure in time. It is even more crucial when it comes to 
ensuring the welfare of people living in a State or meta-State.
J.D.: Do you already have a view on whether your temporal approach can 
be put to work to shed some light on the specific forms of trust that States are 
meant to build, or even to allow for?
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T.A.: The social and political world is now as complex as ever. For example, the 
model of State and State sovereignty is not the only one we use, especially in Western 
societies. Beside States, we can see meta-States, such as federations, or political entities 
which are trying to set up a different political model, such as the European Union. 
In a word, the State model is something that must be rethought, at least partially, 
to face the transformations that are profoundly changing the world today. I’m not 
saying that we can live in a world without a political authority. I’m rather claiming 
that, as philosophers, we must rethink the model of social and political institutions. 
These institutions are currently protecting people and their rights while bearing in 
mind only a very short timeframe. But the same institutions regularly perform long-
term actions requiring a very long time to be accomplished. These actions, which 
are necessary to contemporary political and social systems, typically need more than 
one generation to be performed. Above all, they require consent from people whose 
opinion cannot be consulted. If this analysis is correct, we have to conclude that we 
need a political entity to guarantee the rights of yet-to-come people involved (the 
unborn and the next generations) and the fairness of the political system over the years.
J.D.: As you say, you are interested in the modalities of perduration of the 
pillars of our social life. I suggest we distinguish two issues here. It is one thing 
to focus on the transgenerational dimension of civil society, community, civic 
association, citizenship. It seems to be another thing – though I guess the issues 
are deeply intertwined –  to focus on the transgenerational dimension of the 
State apparatus itself, or of State-like bureaucratic and political institutions. In 
our modern conception we may indeed struggle to see the one (civil society) 
without the other (State apparatus). However, I believe that framing the ques-
tion from the point of view of the State or from that of the society does make a 
difference – a difference that to a certain extent corresponds to the gap between 
(Andina 2016) and (Andina forthcoming). It is one thing to say that State-like 
institutions have a long-term perduration and bring about actions that span 
over different generations. It is another thing to say that there are specific ties 
between non-contemporary citizens, and that a society is a unique temporally 
extended body. Do you agree that your work could be categorized along these 
two distinct lines? Do you privilege one of the questions? Or do you think that 
one of the answers supervenes on the other? Or else, do you think this classic 
distinction should be reworked under the terms of your own social ontology, 
your own understanding of the pillars of social life?
T.A.: Yes, it is essential to be careful in drawing the difference. We can put things 
this way. If we think about the transgenerationality regarding actions, I guess it is 
possible to understand the reasons why it is important for me to pay attention to two 
types of transgenerationality. The one bonding individuals, the other bonding institu-
tions. Psychology talks about a primary transgenerationality bonding the individuals 
belonging to the same family and different generations. This transgenerationality is 
something we may observe well in all those situations – like traumas – in which the 
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relationship between people belonging to different generations becomes problematic. I 
believe that we may argue for the idea that these bonds also exists in a much broader 
context, which includes people sharing only a social and political context. This is so, 
in my view, because it is not possible to make a definite disjunction between people 
and institutions. The two things depend on each other and people must be considered 
responsible for the consequences of their actions, primarily because some of them may 
have implications in a broader, institutional framework.
Let’s take an example. Suppose a community is asked to vote to elect the new 
parliament – an action which is not merely institutional. Now suppose a citi-
zen – say, Mrs. X –– among the various options, decides to give her preference to 
a party supporting the idea of massive exploitation of non-renewable resources (e.g. 
oil) to produce the energy necessary to the State. This choice will have consequences 
in terms of the advantages for the generations that will carry out that intensive 
exploitation. For example, the increase in wealth will be reasonably very appeal-
ing to the citizens of that community. On the other hand, Mrs. X knows that 
this choice has at least two very problematic consequences. The first consequence 
is that an extensive use of some of the natural resources to produce wealth will 
progressively decrease the ability for future generations to do so. Furthermore, this 
exploitation will create a substantial modification of the environment in which 
those resources exist. It is evident, I think, that Mrs. X’s individual choice, at the 
very moment of voting, will make a significant difference regarding the preserva-
tion of transgenerationality. In other words, her decision will make a significant 
difference in at least two domains: the preservation of the environment, and the 
equal opportunities between generations. In a word, her choice makes a significant 
difference in terms of fairness.
J.D.: Now, I believe we can find an analogous difference on a normative level 
as well. On the one hand, you may want to say that States’ actions should take 
seriously into account the fact that they should not act only in response to the 
present demands of their citizens but also with the aim of satisfying, anticipating, 
or preventing certain demands from future generations. This is a thesis about how 
we should hold institutions accountable for what they are doing not only for the 
current generation but also for yet-to-come citizens. It is thus a thesis about the 
social function, the mandate, the purpose of the State. On the other hand, you 
may want to say that the current members of a civil society, the citizens at a given 
time, should honour specific obligations regarding the future members of that 
society (of course, part of honouring these obligations is channelled through votes 
and institutional activities, but presumably not all of it). How do you articulate 
these two levels? Who is obliged, exactly, and in whose respect? Should the very 
design of institutions – and/or civic education – take that into consideration?
T.A.: When it comes to transgenerationality, each of us has obligations, just as 
every institution of the State or meta-State we belong to. We are obliged toward all 
that matters and has or may have consequences in terms of the relationship between 
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generations. This obligation is mandatory in those cases in which individual, social 
or political actions necessarily require the cooperation of subjects whose opinion was 
never asked for in any form.
I want to say that a State must seriously take into account the bonds between 
generations because most of the people and institutions daily perform actions involv-
ing a form of cooperation between different generations. The metaphysical status 
of these actions is particular because it implies that one of the parts involved in 
accomplishing the action, was never asked to consent to those actions. To be clear, 
this consent is de facto presupposed by people and institutions subscribing to public 
debts or declaring wars. 
J.D.: The normative ties between generations could be construed in two 
ways. You may think of these ties strictly in terms of distributive justice, as they 
are mainly being discussed under the term ‘intergenerational justice’, and frame 
transgenerational ties in terms of rights (of future generations) and correlative du-
ties (of present-day citizens). But you use the term ‘bond’, intergenerational bond, 
which echoes a contractualist vocabulary. And indeed, another way to construe 
the normative ties between generations is to think of them in terms of some sort 
of cross-temporal social contract, in which case the idea really seems to be that 
one should think of different generations as belonging to the same community 
and sharing substantial ties. Where do you locate yourself in this landscape? 
T.A.: Each social contract has a cross-temporal structure. My question is the 
following: Is it possible for a community to live outside a political or social 
contract? I think it is impossible, especially for large enough communities. Once 
we have recognized this practical necessity, it is also important to realize that 
political institutions are the way they are not only to protect people, but also to 
enable the evolution of society in a long-term perspective. Just think of Giambat-
tista Vico’s New Science. His political model was grounded in the idea of the 
development of human beings and society as well. In this respect, Vico’s model 
was different from the model offered by Hobbes. It seems very plausible that hu-
mankind has gone through an evolutionary path involving the essence of sociality 
and the political structures as well. In my view, this evolution has been possible 
precisely thanks to transgenerationality, that is, the existence of a bond between 
people from different generations. This bond in some cases has a natural basis (as 
in primary transgenerationality). In other instances it derives from particular 
decisions, incorporated in actions (secondary transgenerationality). In my view, 
both bonds are substantial: the first is something present in nature, the second 
is something ‘we’ decide to introduce in the dynamics of our societies. Once it is 
brought into being, we must consider it, taking care of transgenerationality in 
terms of consequences, intergenerational justice, and fairness.
J.D.: As for the idea of a substantial intergenerational bond, I’d like to ask you 
how you conceive of its specificity, given that it involves trust between parties 
128
that share no reciprocity, have no active exchange in a standard sense, and are 
in a position of a strong power imbalance (our actions have serious implications 
for our descendants, their actions can’t have which for us).
T.A.: The point is precisely this: in many actions we act as if a subject (future 
generations) participated in a decision (while this participation does not occur in 
any way) and will participate in the actions necessary to implement that decision 
in the future. That of future generation is apparently a problematic concept under 
various aspects. Indeed, my sense is that we have to proceed to a precise metaphysical 
analysis of this concept. To do this, it is essential to consider a few things. Namely, if 
and how it is possible to talk about future generations instead of future individuals; 
if it is useful to introduce the concept of future generations in our ontologies; finally, 
what we mean by future generations.
My view is that there is a serious case to be made for treating ‘future generations’ 
as particular types of groups, that is, as groups which are not yet ‘active’. Neverthe-
less, they are to be considered as active groups by all those people and institutions 
acting as if future generations already existed. That of ‘future generation’ is a very 
intriguing notion, and its application in our daily lives is even more intriguing.
J.D.: Can you tell us more about the distinction between a ‘primary’ and a 
‘secondary’ transgenerationality? What is its normative meaning? Are those two 
radically distinct sources of normativity, or are they part of the same continuum?
T.A.: ‘Primary’ transgenerationality is the biological tie between members of the 
same family, belonging to different generations. There is relevant psychological evidence 
in this respect. These bonds are biological, and through these bonds people shape their 
personality and their identity. As a philosopher, I am mainly interested in secondary 
transgenerationality, which governs many aspects of our social life. I guess both types 
of transgenerationality imply a form of normativity, but, clearly, these two types of 
normativity differ. The first mainly concerns the sphere of the unconscious; the second 
is a kind of normativity that institutions have to adopt and apply as a guarantee for 
the subjects (future generations) involved or presupposed as a condition for the realiza-
tion of particular actions. This normativity, to be incisive, requires the rule of law.
J.D.: You reflect both on debt inheritance as an important transgenerational 
problem and on the European Union as a meta-State institution with obvious 
transgenerational ambitions. Can you say a word about the meaning of each in 
terms of a social ontology with social implications? Do your considerations on 
transgenerationality carry a takeaway as for what a European debt policy could 
be (and whether there should be one at that level)?
T.A.: This is an interesting question. My sense is that philosophical analysis – especially 
in the domain of descriptive metaphysics – does not imply that philosophers are suggesting 
political solutions. It implies, though, that we provide politicians with good arguments 
to adopt some decisions instead of others. The problem of the high public debt of many 
highly industrialized democracies of the Western world is a critical issue. Economists 
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know that a large part of public wealth is now used to pay debts usually contracted by 
States in the past. This economic dynamic – i.e. to use a significant amount of money to 
keep promises made in the past – is breaking down the possibilities of development for 
today’s democracies. These States’ populations –especially in the weaker social strata suffer 
from that. Kant was optimistic about the relationship between generations; we – with 
Rawls – are much more conscious of the fact that transgenerationality is something neutral, 
neither positive nor negative. It is a bond that acquires a connotation depending on the 
decisions of the people and institutions that handle it. 
Post Script
Talking to Tiziana Andina, I have realized how, in the analytical literature on 
trust, we often overlook the temporal dimension of institutions, along with its 
descriptive and normative implications for trust – beyond evolutionary discus-
sions and repeated games modelling. This is significant for the trust we invest in 
certain institutions, as well as for the trust that is produced or facilitated by these 
institutions. This leaves us with at least two directions for the debate on trust. 
First, when we cast our trust in institutions in terms of a mandate, of a specific 
form of entrusting, we can hardly take into consideration longer-term dimen-
sions of the State’s mission. If we take seriously the idea that States carry out both 
intragenerational and transgenerational actions, we will realize that the sort of 
trust we may or may not place in them is of a more sophisticated and open-ended 
kind: the trusters themselves (society members, but also other stakeholders) and 
their particular demands are changing, while the trustee (viz. the State) and some 
of its complex mandates may stay the same. The future-directed dimension of 
States cannot be ignored when it comes to the nature of the trust we may place in 
them – and how it departs from the trust invested in a government, for example. 
Second, when we contemplate the institutional conditions of social trust, we 
tend to focus on the past and the present workings of socio-political institutions: 
how they ‘originally’ allowed for the emergence of trust and how they ‘currently’ 
sustain the conditions of social and political trust. But certain institutions seem 
to produce social trust also by shaping the horizon of our common long-term 
future. Intergenerationality may shed some light on the diachronic extension of 
the communities of trust, whether this is understood contractually, as a temporally 
extended social contract, or constitutively, as a form of belonging.
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